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Intelligence, Reason of State and the Art of Governing  
 




Drawing upon primary and secondary historical material, this article explores the role of 
intelligence in early modern government. It focuses upon developments in 17
th
 and early 18
th
 
century England, a site specific genealogical moment in the broader history of state 
power/knowledges. Addressing a tendency in Foucauldian work to neglect pre-18
th
 century 
governance, the analysis reveals a set of interrelated processes which gave rise to an innovative 
technique for anticipating hazard and opportunity for the state. At the intersection of raison 
d’Etat, the evolving art of government, widespread routines of secrecy, and a post-Westphalia 
field of European competition and exchange, intelligence was imagined as a fundamental solution 
to the concurrent problems of ensuring peace and stability while improving state forces. In the 
administrative offices of the English Secretary of State, an assemblage of complex and 
interrelated procedures sought to produce and manipulate information in ways which exposed 
both possible risks to the state and potential opportunities for expansion and gain. As this 
suggests, the art of intelligence played an important if largely unacknowledged role in the 
formation and growth of the early modern state. Ensuring strategic advantage over rivals, 
intelligence also limited the ability of England’s neighbours to dominate trade, control the seas, 
and master the colonies, functioning as a constitutive feature of European balance and 
equilibrium. As the analysis concludes, understanding intelligence as a form of governmental 
technique – a way of doing something - reveals an entirely novel way of thinking about and 
investigating its myriad (historical and contemporary) formations.  
 
 




Through the analysis of primary and secondary historical documents, this article explores the role 
of intelligence in early modern government. For largely practical reasons – chief among which, 
the availability of source material in English – the empirical focus is on events in the English 
Commonwealth. While developments in intelligence (and government) played out differently 
across European states and territories
1
, the English experience represents an historically 
significant, site specific genealogical moment in the broader history of state power/knowledges. 
Conventional work on intelligence has typically focused upon either the development and 
activities of particular institutions (for example, Deacon, 1970; Karalekas, 1977; Andrew, 1985; 
Darling, 1990; Cain, 1994), the role played by espionage and other secret operations in military 
conflict (Farago, 1962; Fergusson, 1984; Kahn, 1985), the history of specific practices like 
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spying and letter opening (Seth, 1957; Deutsch, 1977; Ferris, 1989), or the place of intelligence 
‘cycles’ in the policy making process (Andrew & Noakes, 1987; Hastedt, 1991; Codevilla, 1992). 
More recent work in international relations, security studies, criminology and (socio-) legal 
scholarship has often borrowed from this largely realist field of ‘intelligence studies’.2 In a 
departure from more orthodox approaches, the analysis here makes clear that at a particular 
historical moment – characterised by an early form of government through raison d’Etat (‘reason 
of state’), widespread routines of secrecy, and a post-Westphalia field of European competition 
and (commercial) exchange between states - intelligence was imagined and set forth as a strategic 
art of government for identifying risk and opportunity for the early modern state. As the article 
will demonstrate, re-conceptualising intelligence as a form of governmental technique – a way of 
doing something – reveals an entirely novel way of thinking about and investigating its historical 
trajectory, its different practices and procedures, and its many (past and present) formations.  
 
As the historical evidence makes clear, shortly after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, under the 
tenure of Lord Protector Cromwell’s Secretary of State John Thurloe, intelligence was 
(re)imagined as a complex art of government which was fundamental to the interests of the state. 
That is, ‘intelligence’ came to be understood as something more than information, something 
more than news, and something more than its collection. Rather it was increasingly articulated as 
a forward looking, prognostic and strategic endeavour to furnish decision makers with the 
knowledge they required to govern effectively. In part, this meant discovering plots, conspiracies 
and dangerous designs against the state, so as to prevent insurrection or fend off invasion. More 
broadly however, it also meant generating, integrating and synthesising all sorts of different 
information in ways which exposed both good and bad possibilities for the state; a process which 
enabled the visualisation, calculation and manipulation of all that which might pose some hazard 
or opportunity for the Commonwealth. This meant developing procedures not only for collecting 
information, but also for organising, cataloguing and collating different material in fairly 
systematic ways. The body of knowledge so produced concerned not just the movements and 
activities of dissident factions and foreign militaries, but also the forces, resources, alliances and 
even the intentions of England’s European neighbours. This made possible the anticipation and 
avoidance of risks to peace, stability and prosperity, but also the identification and manipulation 
of potential opportunities for advantage and gain. As this suggests, the art of intelligence played 
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an important if largely unacknowledged role in the formation and growth of the early modern 
state, and – to the extent that it also limited the ability of rivals to dominate trade, control the 
seas, and master the colonies – functioned as a constitutive feature of European balance and 
equilibrium. 
 
With some few exceptions however (for example, Miller, 1990), histories of state 
power/knowledge have largely neglected early modern developments. In Foucauldian work more 
broadly, a preoccupation with liberalism, governmentality, and (to a lesser extent) police, has 




 This might 
be a consequence of the order in which Foucault’s work was translated into English, or it could 
stem from his assertion that the art of government did not acquire its ‘full scope and consistency’ 
until the second half of the 18
th
 century (see for example, Foucault, 2007, p. 101). Whatever the 
reason, the journey from sovereignty and the divine right of kings to liberalism and the 
government of men and things is made possible only by the intervention of raison d’Etat – a 





century sovereignty. In fact, the 17
th
 century – the century of raison d’Etat – could be accurately 
described as a prolonged moment of transition during which the art of government was slowly 
and steadily woven into existing arrangements; a process which gave birth to many new 
governmental techniques and apparatuses, and which played an important role in the eventual rise 
of governmentality and the ‘governmentalisation of the state’. This is perhaps why Foucault 
(2007, p. 286, 287) compared the significance of raison d’Etat  to the scientific revolution 
triggered by Galileo, Descartes and Kepler, and why he chose to spend time scrutinising its 
emergence and transformation. In the end, and somewhat at variance with contemporary research 
preferences, he concluded that the allied ‘transition from the rivalry of princes to the competition 
of states is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental mutations in both the form of Western 
political life and the form of Western history’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 294).  
 
Governing Through Raison d’Etat  
In his Security, Territory, Population lectures, Foucault made clear that while the logic and 
institutions of sovereignty remained predominant well into the 18
th
 century, theoretical texts from 
the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 centuries sought to build an early and yet crude form of government 
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into extant political arrangements. While the treatises written by Palazzo, Botero, La Perriere and 
others excited a ‘general problem of government’, any particular form was seen as yet ‘internal to 
the state’ and thus supplementary to a type of government that must be ‘applied to the state as a 
whole’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 93). This specific and imperative mode of government would be the 
responsibility of a sovereign; a ‘rationality, calculation or type of thought’ through which a 
prince could govern ‘men and things’ within the framework of sovereignty (Foucault, 2007, p. 
232). Both innovation and scandal, the political theory of raison d’Etat offered a diagram in 
which the state was endowed with its own ‘reason’; a knowledge of that which was necessary to 
found, preserve and extend the state (Botero, 1606, p. 1). This knowledge would be a knowledge 
of ‘things’ rather than laws, of the characteristics, dimensions and forces of the state (Foucault, 
1991, p. 96), where the state was too be understood as a complex domain (or jurisdiction) with a 
set of laws, rules, customs, institutions, and people. That is, the theory of raison d’Etat envisaged 
the state as both the foundational principle and ultimate objective of proper government. As the 
‘regulatory idea’ for raison d’Etat, the state represented a way of re-thinking and re-organising 
certain already established elements and institutions in ‘governmental terms’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 





To ensure the constancy of his reign, a prince would have to preserve and extend the state, a task 
which would require of him more than simply applying the law with justice, wisdom, prudence, 
and mercy. Rather he would need to develop and govern through a detailed knowledge of the 
state, of its inherent characteristics and traits, and of how best to preserve and enhance its various 
dimensions and forces. Invested with raison d’Etat, ‘[i]nstead of merely controlling territories 
and maintaining the loyalty of subjects, modern sovereign power, increasingly concerned with 
governing the future, sets out to govern risks’ to the state (Valverde, 2007, p. 163). This temporal 
re-orientation of sovereignty would in turn require new techniques for the ‘intellectual mastery’ 
of the state (Miller & Rose, 1990) but also – as we will shortly see - for mastering all that which 
might its threaten its peace and stability or indeed contribute to its perseverance and growth. 
Statistics for example, would provide a mechanism through which the state’s many features could 
be categorised, quantified, measured, (and thus) known and manipulated. In establishing different 
categories of measurement and ascribing numerical values to particular dimensions of the state, 
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statistics also ‘constituted’ the state as a knowable and governable entity (see for example, 
Hacking 1982, 1990; Porter, 1986). And yet, as historians have shown, this ‘science of the state’ 
(or ‘political arithmetic’) did not mature until well into the 18th century, and the sporadic ventures 
before then amounted to fairly basic estimations for one explicit purpose or another.
5
 Indeed it 
was not until the second half of the 18
th
 century that more routinised and systematic 
measurements coupled with the rise of probability theory to drive the intensification and 
proliferation of statistics across Europe (see for instance, Ball, 2004; Hald, 2003; Stigler, 1986). 
For Foucault (2007, p. 101), this retarded development of statistics can be attributed in part to the 
great crises that plagued the 17
th
 century, which ensured the voracity of sovereignty and 
‘imprisoned’ the art of government. 
Basically, the art of government could only spread, be reflected, and take on and increase 
its dimensions in a period of expansion free from the great military, economic, and 
political emergencies that plagued the seventeenth century from beginning to end. 




And yet while sovereignty would therefore endure as the dominant political modality in Europe, 
the emergence and proliferation of raison d’Etat gradually entwined the art of government into 
sovereign institutions and arrangements. That is, government ‘did not remain up in the air’ as 
merely theoretical idea (Foucault, 2007, p. 100), and had tangible correlations in political 
discourse
7
 and concrete exercise. Chief among these was a discernible emphasis upon preserving 
and protecting the state, evident not only in the work of theorists like Giovanni Botero
8
 but also 
in the more practical writings of political figures like Sir Francis Bacon.
9
 Indeed while the 18
th
 
century would mark the ascendency of programmes for state expansion (a development not 
independent of the rise of police), the 17
th
 century was one in which ‘general crisis’ (Trevor-
Roper, 1959) ensured the primacy of the problem of state preservation and stability. Across 
Europe, writers and rulers became increasingly preoccupied with the ‘constantly present’ dangers 
of sedition, rebellion, scarcity, financial collapse and the ruin of trade (Foucault, 2007, p. 271).
10
 
This environment of constantly threatening, major calamities weighed heavily on the policy of all 
Western monarchies (Foucault, 2007, p. 101, 102), infusing both political discourse and concrete 
exercise with decidedly protective characteristics. For the early architects of raison d’Etat, the 
problem of extending a state was therefore always supplementary to its preservation: only by first 
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obtaining the peace and stability of a state - which would otherwise ‘not be able to maintain 
itself…for one hour’ (Palazzo, 1611, p. 14-16) - could it be strengthened and enhanced.11 In 
practical terms, this meant developing a detailed knowledge of all those ‘disagreeable 
possibilities’ (Botero, 1606, p. 12) which might affect the state’s constancy, and which must be 
avoided so as to prevent ‘the cycle of birth, growth, perfection and then decadence’ that led to the 
fall of many of the great Empires (Foucault, 2007, p. 289). 
 
In the second half of the 17
th
 century however, this emphasis upon preserving the state was 
increasingly supplemented by a more ‘discrete’ and ‘applied’ characteristic of raison d’Etat: the 
need to improve or extend the state’s forces (Foucault, 2007, p. 288, 289). (The idea that states 
must not only persevere but expand was clearly evident in the earlier texts, though in practice it 
functioned in a rather subordinate way and was secondary to the problem of assuring stability). 
Following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, while the question of state preservation did not 
disappear, there was an intensification of the problem of state expansion. The texts written by 
political practitioners across Europe – both those who participated in the assemblies and those 
responding to the treaties - began to stress the idea that in order to maintain itself, the state must 
also increase its ‘forces’; those intrinsic aspects of the state which included its commercial 
resources, natural resources, human resources, and the nature and balance of trade (Foucault, 
2007, p. 294). If the state was to be imagined as its own end – that is, if it is to be organized by 
reference to itself - then there will always be a plurality of states which will compete with one 
another, since no final unity is imagined (as in the all-encompassing Empire). A state will 
therefore always exist on a field of competition with others, where territorial borders are largely 
fixed and where competition and rivalry are increasingly characterised in economic and 
commercial terms. This new reality for European territories played out in part through increased 
trade and commercial exchange, and a perpetual struggle over ‘monetary circulation, colonial 
conquest, and control of the seas’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 291). Thus - even if in a way that remained 
largely subordinate to the problem of state preservation – post-Westphalia raison d’Etat 






From Royal Households to the Administrative Offices of State  
This re-articulation of the rationale and means for governing early modern states was in turn 
linked to the development of an administrative apparatus and the various ‘offices of state’ across 
Europe. As historians have shown (see for example, Evans, 1923), if a prince was seen as the 
‘owner’ of a kingdom by the very laws of nature, then nothing more than direct rule by his 
command (and through his household) was required of him. To govern through raison d’Etat 
however, ‘household methods and instruments’ would need to be replaced with ‘administrative’ 
techniques, organised through different offices of state which were staffed with new ranks of 
semi-autonomous officials (Gunn, 1995, p. 4). Beginning in the early part of the 17
th
 century, 
 …an informal, fluid, and – as it were – household arrangement dependent on the whim 
 of the king [was replaced] by a permanent, fixed, and bureaucratically organized board of 
 government which, though still fully dependent on the king in its work, had emancipated 
 itself from the whim of the moment as well as from close association with the [royal]
 household… (Elton, 1962, p. 344-345) 
It is precisely through this administrative apparatus that many new knowledges and techniques 
were invented and refined,  
 According a visibility to the minutiae of the activities of the nation, devising the 
 calculative techniques through which this visibility might be made operable, and 
 representing the nation by means of a variety of knowledges…a crucial step in the very 
 construction of “the state”...  (Miller, 1990, p. 323) 
 
As Peter Miller (1990) has shown for example, late 17
th
 century French Secretary of State for 
Marine, Superintendent of Commerce and Buildings, and Controller of Finance Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert established a range of innovative procedures for managing the relationship between the 
French state and private enterprise. His specific inventions included a set of formal requirements 
for keeping ‘books of account’ (via the legal Ordinance of 1673), pedagogic mechanisms for 
instructing merchants in proper accounting procedures (using textbooks and manuals), and the 
representation of ‘accounting’ in a broader discourse of ‘order’; an assemblage which elevated ‘a 
desire to know the nation and its subjects in fine detail into an essential resource of political rule’ 
(Miller, 1990, p. 322; see also, Miller, 1986). Such ventures were often initiated and directed by 
Europe’s Secretaries of State12, pivotal state officials throughout the 17th century who played an 
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increasingly central role in directing ‘government policy in almost every sphere, at home and 
abroad’ (Aubrey, 1990, p. 4).13 In France and Spain, Secretarial responsibilities were divided 
among several different offices, while in England a single Secretary had responsibility for both 
domestic and foreign affairs. And while the English Secretary was directly accountable to the 
Queen and Privy Council (until the direction of state offices was transferred to Parliament in 
1688), from its inception the office was largely autonomous from the royal household and 
afforded an extremely broad mandate (Elton, 1963; Highham, 1925).
14
 Appointing the first 
Secretary of State near the end of her reign in 1603, Queen Elizabeth granted the office-holder 
wide-ranging powers and responsibilities, including managing ‘religion’ and disorderly factions 
within the realm, overseeing the affairs of English ‘dominions beyond the sea’, supervising the 
‘Councils’ established at the ‘borders of the realm’, defending the kingdom ‘by land and sea’, 
monitoring revenue, taxation, commerce and trade, and organising diplomatic intercourse and 
‘intelligence’.15  
 
Reinventing Intelligence I: A Continuous Surveillance of People and Things 
From the middle of the 16
th
 century, the word ‘intelligence’ referred not only to a faculty of 
individual understanding but also ‘true information’ or ‘news’; reliable fact which could be 
distinguished from rumour or hearsay (from Johnson, 1773; see also, Sabin, 1985, p. 3; 
Neocleous, 2003, p. 50-51). By the early decades of the 17
th
 century, collecting dependable 
information was one of the Secretary’s most vital tasks (Fraser, 1956; Marshall, 1994, 2003). As 
the official outlet for up-to-date, trustworthy news, the English Secretary was responsible for 
learning about events on the continent and in the distant corners of the realm, and regularly 
conveying intelligence reports to the King and his Council (of which it was said an earl was there 
for ‘ornament’, a bishop by ‘reason of his office’, and the Secretary for ‘service and 
communication of intelligence’; Evans, 1923, p. 237). To carry out this task, early Secretaries 
relied upon a number of fairly informal measures, including a semi-regular correspondence with 
English consuls and envoys sent abroad, the solicitation of reports from military commanders in 
the field, and requests for official accounts from diplomatic emissaries posted to foreign Courts. 
In the middle of the 17
th
 century however, as the Treaties of Westphalia re-ordered international 
relations and domestic instability climaxed with the beheading of King Charles I and the 
installation of the Protectorate, Lord Protector Cromwell’s Secretary of State John Thurloe set 
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about radically re-thinking the nature of intelligence, and its place and role in securing the 
interests of state.  
 
After more than a decade of civil war encompassing England, Ireland and Scotland, Oliver 
Cromwell forcibly dissolved Parliament in 1653 and acquired ‘chief magistracy’ and the 
‘administration of government’ for life via constitutional settlement (the ‘Instrument of 
Government’). With no royal blood, yet acting as a king in all but name, Cromwell – a military 
commander from the New Model Army - relied heavily upon military backing for his political 
authority. Despite this support however, the Protectorate was anything but secure, and faced 
regular often violent opposition from royalists who wished to reinstall the monarchy, 
‘republicans’ who opposed the idea of military rule (and Cromwell’s increasing autocracy), and 
any number of religious factions who clamoured for equal rights. Confronted by acute domestic 
instability, Cromwell lobbied tirelessly for the further militarisation of English government, and 
in 1655 successfully divided England (and Wales) into fifteen military districts, each with its own 
major-general who would ensure local stability and shore up support for the Protectorate regime. 
In London however, Parliament voiced concerns about Cromwell’s increasingly military-based 
system of government, and in 1656 – after rejecting yet another proposal to establish a permanent 
standing army – the military districts were dissolved. With rising instability on a number of 
different fronts, and mounting resistance to further militarisation in London, Cromwell turned to 
his Secretary of State John Thurloe who had an altogether different vision. For Thurloe, if 
domestic uprisings could not be forestalled with the proper application of military deterrence, 
they could instead be foreseen and prevented with the proper use of intelligence. With 
Cromwell’s blessing (and his purse), Thurloe set about re-thinking and re-configuring the ways in 
which the Secretary’s office generated, manipulated and exploited information, establishing a 
complex and integrated set of procedures for anticipating dangers to the Commonwealth.  
 
Having worked under Secretary Thurloe (and later on Secretaries Morice and Benett after the 
Restoration
16
), Samuel Moreland outlined Thurloe’s approach in a ‘Brief Discourse concerning 
the Nature and Reason of Intelligence’, written sometime near the turn of the 17th century.17 
Intelligence, Moreland claimed, is more than information, more than news, and requires more of 
a Secretary than collecting and circulating facts. Rather it must be understood and practiced as a 
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complex art of government which is fundamental to ensuring the interests of state, maintaining 
the constancy of ‘Government’, and securing ‘his royal person’.18 Amity, friendship and trust are 
extremely rare ‘between men’ Moreland declared, but can almost never exist between states, as 
these are ‘gover’d wholly by politick maxims, & move in Orbs excentrick’ to those of their 
‘Neighbours & Allies’. That is, states will always pursue their own interests and objectives, and 
seek to improve their own welfare and position, even if to the detriment of those with whom they 
have reached agreement. A prince should therefore always distrust his subjects and guard 
constantly against the ‘lopping men’ and ‘Heroes of the populace’ who have ‘thrown their 
unskilful riders many times’19, but he should also doubt his neighbours, even those with whom he 
has some accord. Rather than putting his faith in treaties and alliances (which are ‘easily 
broken’), he should instead seek to discover the minds and intentions of his neighbours, always 
looking ahead and reasoning like a ‘cunning Gamester’. In so doing, he must develop endeavours 
‘to know what cards’ are in their hands so that he may play his own ‘to the best advantage’. 
Intelligence properly practiced will expose the true nature of his subjects and his neighbours - 
their interests, their ambitions and their designs – furnishing him with the ‘clarity’ and ‘foresight’ 
needed to govern properly in an uncertain and anarchic environment; it is the ‘mother of 
prevention’, ‘essential to the arts of government’20, for want of which ‘a Prince may lose his 
crown or life’.  
 
Recruiting ‘Centinels’ 
An important dimension to this art of intelligence is what Moreland referred to as having ‘a 
constant View of all that passes at any moment’, a sort of perpetual surveillance of people and 
things. Under Secretary Thurloe’s tenure, upon which Moreland drew in his discourse, this was 
accomplished by three primary instruments: (i) an expansive network of spies and informants (or 
‘Centinels’); (ii) centralized control and manipulation of the post; and (iii) a ‘universal’ system of 
correspondence. The effect of such measures was that,  
Under his eyes in constant review, there passed accounts of events both great and small, 
which occurred in England or in the capitals and other large cities of Europe…all news 
had its significance for him, whether it was the reaction of the London citizens towards 
the accession of the Protector, a minister preaching publicly against increase of taxation, 
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or the number and disposition of enemy armies and fleets. (Quotation in Hobman, 1961, 
p. 14) 
The most thoroughly documented of these initiatives has been the Secretary’s use of spies and 
informants in learning about the activities, movements and plans of dissident factions and 
religious sects both in England and on the continent (especially in France, where the son of 
Charles I and his loyal noblemen lived in exile).
21
 And yet Thurloe also recruited informants who 
would send information from quite distant lands and territories, including reports upon the 
deliberations of Royal Courts and detailed accounts of events in vital ports, towns, and villages.  
 
While some would come forward of their own accord (offering him their service in exchange for 
payment; see for example, Aubrey, 1990, p. 94), the Secretary also set about recruiting men of 
quality who he considered to be well connected, well placed and likely amenable to financial 
incentive. Citing these typically clandestine efforts, John Wildman - a solider and political figure 
who eventually held the office of Postmaster General from 1689-1691 – later advocated that 
Charles II follow closely Thurloe’s model, and that  
…all means imaginable be used to gain over some two or three of the principall members 
of every…reigning faction…who may separately, (that so they may be of checks to each 
other for the more sure discovery of the truth) and with all manner of secrecy, hold a 
constant correspondence with your honour, and…give you an exact account of what 
soever passes or is transacted at such meetings, so shall you be able to crush all their 
designs in the egge, and hinder them from ever coming to any maturity…22 
To organise and manage his growing network of spies, Thurloe devised an accounting scheme for 
maintaining written records of ‘intelligence disbursements’ his office paid out. While his 
predecessors had kept only sporadic books of account, Thurloe retained transcripts which listed 
his different informants (typically by code name or alias) along with how much they were paid 
and when. By keeping such registers, his office was able to ensure not only a centralised and 
organised system for financial accounting, but also a means for evaluating the constancy, 
reliability and value of his different sources. Such an unprecedented degree of organization and 
systematization in the management of spies and informants has even led some to aver that his 
office was in effect the first ‘London Headquarters’ for a ‘modern Intelligence Service’ 
(Hobman, 1961, p. 23; see also Helt, 1994).  
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Manning the ‘Watchtower’ 
Less well known than his use of spies and informants are Thurloe’s relentless efforts to expand 
and integrate the inland and foreign post, and to establish a single, consolidated post office in 
London. In the middle of the 1650’s he was able to merge the different postal relays throughout 
the Commonwealth and bring the entire apparatus under Secretarial control. This allowed for the 
appointment of special letter openers in London who would secretly comb through and copy 
correspondence before sending it on its way. This second instrument for ensuring a constant view 
of things – which Samuel Moreland later referred to as having a permanent ‘Watchtower’ – was 
based upon the notion that private letters and packets would provide the Secretary with a 
continuous and reliable stream of information that correspondents assumed private, and which 
would therefore include valuable information. After the Restoration, John Wildman celebrated 
Thurloe’s manipulation of the post, stressing its value for assuring continued peace and stability; 
Another great intrigue…was carefully to watch the Generall letter Office, and it very 
much concernes the publick peace that the same be done now; for through this Office are 
conveyed all the poisonous distempers of the Citty into the whole kingdome…[back 
then]… there were almost every post night letters of consequence intercepted…23  
The practice of intercepting letters was of course nothing particularly new. Francis Walsingham 
for one (principal secretary to Queen Elizabeth) had seized letters and packets while trying to root 
out Catholicism in England. And yet rather than limiting postal circulation and intermittently 
seizing packets (when he had reason to suspect some plot or conspiracy), Thurloe lobbied 
extensively for the expansion of the postal routes, the integration of the different relays into one 
common system, and the centralisation of control over the entire apparatus in London. This 
allowed him to capitalise upon increased circulation by instituting regular, systematic procedures 
for opening, reading and copying correspondence, and to avoid the problem faced by his 
predecessors of trying to convince individual couriers to hand over their packets.  
 
While previous Secretaries had been forced to try and pressure couriers to deliver seemingly 
suspicious letters, and though in 1582 this helped Francis Walsingham uncover a plot to install 
Mary, Queen of Scots, on the throne, Thurloe believed that without formal power over postal 
officials it would be impossible to acquire the full and necessary ‘influence upon them’.24 As a 
result, in 1655, after lobbying Parliament on ‘reasons of state’, he secured the office of 
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Postmaster for himself - an appointment which had previously only been held by private licensee. 
This granted him the powers of both Secretary of State and Postmaster, a move which enfolded 
the English system of post into the administrative apparatus and allowed Thurloe to institute 
widespread changes. In 1657, an Act for a single consolidated English, Scottish and Irish postage 
was set out - a law premised upon Thurloe’s decisive argument that a universal, state 
administered post was vital for ‘preventing dangerous designs against the state’ (see Firth, 1897; 
Joyce, 1893; Turner, 1918). Subsequent legislation in the late 1650’s and early 1660’s reinforced 
and extended this control over the Postmasters office, furnishing the Secretary with legal powers 
for the ‘survey and inspection of all letters’, ‘hearing and determination’ of complaints against 
the office, and control over the appointment and removal of Postmasters and other officials 
(which allowed the dismissal of those who were uncooperative or ‘against whom exception was 
taken’).25 Under this new arrangement, Thurloe was able to keep his fingers on ‘the pulse of all 
political movement’ (Hyde, 1894, p. 238), formalising one of the key instruments of his wider 
‘preventive monopoly’ (Whyman, 2000, p. 3) on information. 
 
By his order, a special group of deputies and assistants – including John Wallis, Isaac Dorislaus 
and Sir Samuel Moreland himself (Bond, 1955; Whyman, 2000) - was instructed to ‘reside 
constantly’ in a private room adjoining the foreign letter office in London, where they would 
open, read and copy correspondence from 11pm until ‘3 or 4 in the morning, which was the 
usuale time of shutting up the male’.26 Since even letters ‘to as from all Ambassadours and 
publick Ministers were constantly opened, and copies of them sent to Mr. Thurloe’27, letter 
openers had to be diligent, dexterous and discreet, seamlessly re-sealing packets to avoid being 
discovered. The fear was that if the letter openers were discovered, people might stop using the 
post - something which would have a significant impact upon Thurloe’s ability to gather 
precisely the sort of information he was after.
28
 Following the integration of the inland and 
foreign relays, Thurloe also appointed a set of multi-lingual clerks for ‘extracting, copying, 
translating, etc. all matters of correspondence’29 that came into and departed the Commonwealth. 
This supplied him with all manner of correspondence from as far afield as the Baltic, Italy, Spain, 
France, Moscow and the German states, including private letters sent between relatives, friends, 
merchants and powerful nobles, official communiques and ‘instructions’ passed between 
ambassadors, ministers and other state officials, and a regular stream of ‘gazettes’ and 
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‘newsletters’ (state authored pamphlets printed en masse which reported official appointments, 
military victories, and parliamentary proceedings among other things). 
  
Following the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, the practice of letter opening was widely 
condemned as yet further evidence of the perversion of Cromwell’s Protectorate. To alleviate 
widespread fears that private packets were being delayed in order to be read and copied, post-
Restoration Postmaster General Henry Bishop invented a process of ‘letter stamping’ which 
imprinted on the front of each packet the date it was received by the office, reassuring 
correspondents that their letters were not being delayed (Bishop’s ‘postmark’ may have been the 
first stamp used in England). Secretaries of State Nicholas, Morice and Benett however, were 
quietly rather enamoured with both the efficiency and the utility of Thurloe’s system, and the 
practice opening letters for the most part continued (if more discreetly). In a ‘Memorial Touching 
on the Government of the Post Office’ written for Charles II sometime between 1660 and 1666, 
Thomas Ibson argued that given the ‘divers animosities’ and different ‘sects’ at work within ‘the 
bowels’ of the realm - ‘which without a general correspondency can never prosper’ - there is no 
place or office ‘more worthy of…inspection, than the Post Office’. Indeed, while the information 
amassed by opening private letters covered much more than the activities of rebellious factions 
and sects, the practice was most often advocated and defended on the grounds that it was vital for 
securing the state against subversive and treasonous elements. In 1677, Secretary Henry Coventry 
argued that for precisely this reason, ‘the opening of letters’ is ‘what no man can justify but from 
reason of state’ (printed in Highman, 1932, p. 212), and only ‘a Secretary of State may demand 
an account of any letters that come into the post house’.30 
 
Yet as John Wildman observed after the Restoration, the more difficult problem for Thurloe (as 
for his successors) was the network of unofficial couriers and ‘foot posts’ who delivered packets 
in and around the city of London for a fee.
31
 Despite much effort, Thurloe was never able to bring 
these private carriers under his control, and often the best he could manage was to  
‘immediately before a rising…send 2 or 3 Messengers of his Councill to seize and bring 
away all the pacquetts and letters they could finde about all the carriers and foot posts 
throughout the Citty, which were most commonly throwne aside and never returned…   
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This, Wildman argued, was to leave things too late ‘when the plotts were not onely contrived, but 
just ready to be put in action’. It also had the unfortunate effect of often leading to the ‘utter 
undoing of divers poore people’ who had their letters of attorney, bills of exchange, and private 
correspondence lost forever. His solution to this problem was to establish a complex licensing 
scheme through a new ‘Commission’ which would 
…take cognizance both of the names, and usuall lodging places of all the ordinary carriers 
and footposts in or about the Citty, as likewise that the said person bee empowered to 
administer an oath of fidelity to his Majestie’s service to every of them, and then give 
them licenses, that so he may have some kinde of influence upon them, and the better 
opportunity to treat and deale with them in private, to make them willing to send him [the 
letters] sealed up about 2 houres before his setting out… 
 
A ‘Universal Correspondence’ 
Thurloe’s colonisation of the post allowed him to set up what Moreland later described as a 
universal system of correspondence
32
 which encompassed a variety of contacts in nearly every 
territory and kingdom in Europe. The increasingly regular letters sent between the Secretary’s 
office in London and English ambassadors posted abroad here became only one facet of a much 
broader and more expansive network of communication, including many who sent Thurloe 
packets at great personal risk.
33
 These included travelling merchants, ministers and nobles, 
‘friends to the crown’ living abroad, unnamed contacts in European ports, towns and cities, and a 
number of ‘influential’ persons in distant Courts (see for example, Hobman, 1961). Other regular 
contacts included ‘Lieutenants and titled persons’ in the English counties, local customs officers, 
naval storekeepers, postmasters and other low level administrators, army commanders in the 
field, several prominent scholars, and a host of ‘unidentified’ persons.34 Indispensable to his web 
of correspondence was a group of professional ‘intelligencers’; well connected, well informed 
‘gentlemen of quality’ who supplied information for a prescribed fee (or occasionally on longer 
term contract) (see for instance, Birch, 1849). Though intelligencers - like spies – often worked 
discreetly and sold information for profit, they were perceived as ‘professional’ writers of news 
whose accounts were far more reliable (and therefore far more valuable) than those of spies and 
‘turncoats’.35 In fact it was not uncommon for wealthy merchants, aristocrats, and even well-
heeled ministers to hire their own intelligencers, and while Thurloe certainly wasn’t the first to 
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engage such services, by the time of the Restoration it was said that Henry Muddiman - who 
assisted then Secretary Nicholas with the ‘system of letters’ – had inherited the most widespread 
network in Europe (Muddiman, 1923). 
 
While Thurloe’s different correspondents would often ask for news of England, he was typically 
averse to sharing anything more than a brief account of events, and most often shared not even 
that - his was a largely one-way system. Financial restraints and a massive failure of the 
intelligence apparatus during the second Anglo-Dutch war however, forced Secretaries Morice 
and Benett to re-consider this practice and make some changes to how their offices shared 
information. Following a disastrous naval encounter with the Dutch in 1666 (in which most of the 
English fleet was destroyed), a Parliamentary inquiry led by Prince Rupert questioned Morice 
and Benett on why they had underestimated the size of the Dutch fleet and mistakenly expected 
the French to join the battle. (The Prince had devised his strategy based upon their assessments, 
and so fatally divided the English fleet). Both Secretaries claimed ‘want of intelligence from 
abroad’, which they argued stemmed from increasingly limited budgets. Having been refused 
more money in a period of significant financial constraint, their quite inventive solution was to 
instead offer information of their own in exchange. Immediately they had  
…a newsletter compiled that skimmed the cream of the weekly letters of some fifty 
correspondents scattered all over the kingdom, added news of [their] own such as official 
appointments and parliamentary proceedings, employed some four or five clerks to 
multiply the copy in manuscript, and sent out these newsletters every week as a quid pro 
quo to all…correspondents and to a substantial number of ‘country friends’ (Fraser 1956: 
28)   
Well before the end of the 17
th
 century, this innovative system of two-way information exchange 
became ‘indispensable’ to the intelligence apparatus, ‘without which it could not proceed’ 
(Secretary Williamson c. 1676). As the Secretaries newsletters became extremely desirable both 
in England and on the continent, their pool of correspondents was not only maintained but 






Intelligence and the Problem of Secrecy 
As these three instruments suggest, Thurloe’s vision for intelligence was ordered not only by the 
requirements of raison d’Etat and the available technologies of the time, but by widespread 
routines of secrecy which made difficult learning all that he needed to know. Nearly all of the 
texts on raison d’Etat from the 17th century averred that a detailed knowledge of one’s own state 
and of other states was vital for maintaining strength and stability (see also, Foucault, 1988/1981, 
p. 151; Neocleous, 2003, p. 46). Yet such knowledge was ‘only an instrument of government on 
condition of not being divulged’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 275 footnote). In other words, for the 
knowledge required by raison d’Etat to be effective, it must be kept secret; ‘[a]t the time this was 
an explicit part of raison d’Etat called the arcana imperii, the secrets of power’ (Foucault, 2007, 
p. 275). In particular, the states ‘enemies and rivals’ must not be able to learn the real resources 
available (Foucault, 2007, p. 275), since ‘the more the forces of the state are unknown, the more 
they deserve respect’.36 Following the Peace of Westphalia, this need for secrecy only intensified 
as the prospect of ultimate imperial dominion via endless territorial expansion gave way to a field 
of relatively fixed and yet aggressively competitive states. To maintain balance and equilibrium, 
these states would have to compete in ways that increased their forces but did not bring about the 
ruin of the others or the breakup of the whole (see, Foucault, 2007, p. 297-300). As a result, 
raison d’Etat was increasingly delineated in ‘diplomatic terms’, ‘essentially defined by the 
constitution of a Europe’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 300), and began to make use of several different 
mechanisms
37
 which would allow competition while maintaining ‘peace through the plurality’. 
Foucault referred to one of these mechanisms as an ‘information apparatus (appareil)’38, a 
dimension of which was precisely secrecy, or more specifically, keeping hidden the knowledge 
that the state must develop. As he put it, this will mean  
Knowing one’s own forces (and what’s more hiding them), knowing those of the others, 
allies and adversaries, and hiding the fact that one knows them. (Foucault, 2007, p. 306, 
footnote) 
 
In practice, the imperative for secrecy gave rise to a number of restrictions on the circulation of 
information, particularly that which might expose the actual characteristics and forces of the 
state, including its wealth, military strength, alliances and trade agreements, and its plans for 
growth. This was achieved for example by keeping a close eye on foreign envoys and 
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ambassadors who ‘are for the most part but great spies’39, and implementing a ‘precise 
codification’ of what could and could not be published (see Foucault, 2007, p. 275). In London, 
both tasks were carried out by Thurloe’s many deputies, and in the interests of secrecy, he was 
even ‘quite prepared to deprive […] the public of a basic account of domestic events’ (Fraser, 
1956, p. 29). As elsewhere in Europe, stringent controls on printing were common throughout the 
17
th
 century, and were typically supplemented by rigorous censorship of any pamphlets or 
newsletters which were to be circulated. Successive English Secretaries fought relentlessly 
against any sort of public or free press, and spent much of their time suppressing private printers 
(often through complex licensing schemes which amounted to virtual state monopolies).
40
 While 
some of Thurloe’s officers spent a great deal of effort suppressing unlicensed print material41, the 
1662 Licensing Act made this a somewhat less burdensome task, as a Secretarial monopoly on 
printing was formalised in law.  
This state of affairs made the London Gazette (a printed paper, also under the supervision 
of the Secretary of State, and containing no home news) the only licensed source of news 
for the general public between 1660 and 1688. (Couvee, 1956, p. 251)
42
 
While restrictions on printed matter weren’t anything particularly new to the 17th century43, the 
rationale for prohibiting unofficial printing underwent a discernable shift from the need to 
preserve the relationship between rulers and the ‘giddy multitudes’44, to the need to ensure the 
interests and security of the state. 
 
Thurloe’s measures for assuring secrecy also involved closely monitoring the release of 
information from his offices, making certain that nothing was shared with anyone beyond what 
was considered essential to their particular remit. The reports from different informants, spies and 
correspondents were carefully protected and secured in his London headquarters, while their 
subject matter was divulged only in censored and synthesised form to officials, ministers and/or 
military commanders who were deemed to have some particular need to know. In secret 
dispatches sent directly from his office, by courier and under armed guard, individually tailored 
packets were sent to those he decided were in need of a particular bit of information, usually 
correlated with an area of administrative or military responsibility. In correspondence with his 
sources in England and abroad, he also made plain that they should never share what they learned 
with anyone else; ‘[t]he chief consideration was that the best intelligence could only be got…if 
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their news was kept exclusively to themselves’ (Fraser, 1956, p. 29). That is, the more 
information was shared around, the less valuable it became, as the less of an advantage it 
provided him. After the Restoration, and notwithstanding lesser budgets for intelligence, 
Secretaries Morice and Bennett carried forward many of these routines, variations of which were 
also evident in other European states, and which endured well into the latter decades of the 18
th
 
century (Brian, 1994). 
 
One of the effects of such widespread secrecy however – which was not only endemic to raison 
d’Etat, but a constitutive feature of European competition and balance - was an intensification of 
the problem of acquiring knowledge that others sought to keep hidden. This became all the more 
complex in an environment of increasingly economic and trade-based rivalry, where the more 
knowledge a state could draw upon in negotiating the vicissitudes of commercial exchange, the 
more of an advantage it would have in securing its own interests. In other words, the concurrent 
need to develop knowledge and maintain secrecy – on a field of multiple competitive states, each 
with the exact same requirements - generated a unique problematic in which states needed to 
learn about the others while striving to keep knowledge of themselves hidden. Indeed it is 
precisely this problematic that helped to make the art of intelligence necessary, and give it its 
particular shape and form. As states improved upon their ability to learn things about the others – 
say by reading their mail and recruiting informants from among their trusted courtiers - secrecy 
became more important, and as secrecy was enhanced, intelligence became more vital. 
Highlighting this dynamic relationship, the English merchant and intelligencer Daniel Defoe 
argued near the turn of the century that, 
 As intelligence abroad is so considerable, it follows in proportion that the most useful 
 thing at home is secrecy, for, as intelligence is the most useful to us, so keeping our 
 enemies from intelligence among us is as valuable a head. (Defoe, 1704/1955, p. 264) 
This complex feature of governing through raison d’Etat therefore shaped not only the ways in 
which early modern states sought to develop and protect the knowledges they required, but also 






Reinventing Intelligence II: Identifying Good and Bad Possibilities 
In the second half of the 17
th
 century, while exposing plots, conspiracies and dangerous designs 
against the state remained important, it thus became increasingly vital to learn as much as 
possible about other states; to discover ‘what cards are in their hands’ so one could play one’s 
own to ‘the best advantage’. Indeed, the different measures Thurloe refined sought not only the 
movements and activities of dissident factions and foreign militaries, but also the strengths and 
weaknesses, alliances and ambitions of the Commonwealth’s allies and adversaries - developing 
a ‘perfect knowledge’ of ‘whatsoever they resolved to do’ (Aubrey, 1990, p. 101).45 English 
emissaries sent abroad were instructed to preserve peaceful relations and monitor troop and naval 
deployments, but also to immediately convey to the Secretary any matters ‘which may be of 
concernment to Us and our kingdoms’, including ‘the motions and intentions’ of the Court, 
changes to their available force and ‘treasure’, and any negotiations or proposals for the 
advancement of trade.
46
 More discreetly, Thurloe also ordered assessments of the character, 
strengths and ambitions of prominent foreign nobles, public ministers, and Royal counsellors, 
and even the ‘disposition of merchants’.47 Later on, near the turn of the century, Daniel Defoe 
argued that as this sort of knowledge will be fundamental to the Secretary’s many dealings with 
his neighbours, it should be entered into a concise ‘table’ and constantly updated with 
…all the ministers of state, lists of households, the privy councils, and favorites of every 
court in Europe, and their characters, with exact lists of their forces, names of their 
officers, state of their revenue, methods of government, etc., so just and authentic and 
regularly amended as alterations happen that by this he may duly estimate their strength, 
judge of their interests…and treat with them accordingly… a hundred thousand pounds 
per annum spent…in foreign intelligences might be the best money ever this nation laid 
out… if some money had been well applied, neither the insurrection in Hungary nor the 
war in Poland should have been so fatal to the confederacy as now they are. (Defoe, 
1704/1955, p. 263) 
 
Of course, monitoring royalists and republicans at home and surveying enemy forces in the field 
remained crucial tasks, and Thurloe’s efforts in this regard have figured prominently in historical 
treatments of the period (see for example, Hobman, 1961; Aubrey, 1990). Yet while this has led 
some to claim that intelligence therefore ‘has its roots in military…or security and defence 
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requirements’ (Hibbert, 1990, p. 110), intelligence also figured prominently in the Secretary’s 
efforts to manage English dominions overseas, to stabilise and improve state revenue, to develop 
and expand English trade, and to coordinate diplomatic intercourse. While internal volatility and 
the legal uncertainty of the Protectorate ensured a heightened concern over domestic stability, 
neither Thurloe nor Cromwell were ignorant to other forms of hazard, particularly those which 
might impact upon the Commonwealth’s financial stability and the strength of English trade. 
While hunting for letters sent between known dissenters and nonconformists, deputies at the post 
office were instructed to copy the ‘instructions’, reports and other forms of correspondence sent 
to and from diplomatic envoys in London. Spies and informants were tasked not only with 
penetrating unruly factions and sects
48
, but with observing the comings and goings of foreign 
ambassadors, diplomatic envoys and prominent merchants, wherever possible discovering the 
nature of their meetings and secretly capturing their packets. To this end, Thurloe recruited spies 
not only in London and France (where lived the exiled Prince and his court), but ‘abroad almost 
in every County, and Citty, or town of note’.49 Integrating such diverse material - say a report 
conveying the appointment of a new Secretary of the Navy in France, tales of more frequent 
gatherings of the French envoys to the Spanish Court, and an account of private conferences 
between the Spanish ambassador in Paris and the French Secretaires d’Etat – revealed the 
possibility not of war but of looming trade agreement between France and Spain; a prospect 
which would have particular implications for the voracity of English commerce and continued 
financial stability.  
 
That is, for mid-century raison d’Etat, it is not only the preservation of the state which must be 
assured, but also – and increasingly – its development, expansion and growth. While England did 
not send a delegation to either Osnabruck or Munster, it was nonetheless obliged to conform to 
the increasingly economic and commercial form of rivalry which characterised the relationships 
between European states - a development both enabled and accelerated by the 1648 treaties. As 
the preservation of the state was rearticulated as a matter of ensuring peace and stability while 
enhancing forces, the knowledge required by raison d’Etat also shifted as the imperative to 
protect was increasingly supplemented by a need to acquire and maintain economic and 
commercial dominion. This compelled not only the discovery and prevention of risks to stability, 
but also the identification and exploitation of potential opportunities for advantage or gain. In 
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other words, the Protectorate’s well-rehearsed preoccupation with internal stability coupled with 
a more obligatory and somewhat less pronounced requirement to secure and expand English 
trade, to increase colonial dominion and control over the seas, and to improve the 
Commonwealth’s position vis a vis its neighbours. In practical terms, this meant that reports of 
impending war between Sweden and the northern states, or accounts of imminent treaty between 
France and Spain, would need to be understood and evaluated not only in terms of the problems 
they might engender for peace and stability, but also in terms of the opportunities they could 
present for expansion and growth. The dissolution of long held relationships for instance might 
signal new opportunities for reaching accord with previously engaged states, while forthcoming 
alliances made possible (even necessary) the consideration of new partnerships. After the 
Restoration, such ‘considerations of trade’ would only deepen and intensify as English financial 
strength became a priority for Charles II (see Firth, 1897b, p. 319).  
 
Intelligence as a Form of ‘Estimation’ 
As all of this suggests, Thurloe’s model of intelligence comprised several different mechanisms 
for generating information; information which was necessary for both averting danger and 
identifying opportunity, but which was often difficult to come by. Some of the procedures he 
refined weren’t in themselves all that new - using spies, exchanging letters with diplomatic 
envoys and even intercepting suspicious correspondence have all been traced back much further 
than the 17
th
 century (see for instance, Elias, 1983; Plowden, 1991; Hayes, 1992; Breight, 1996). 
And yet while Thurloe certainly reinvented and extended such measures in quite innovative 
ways, much of the novelty in his approach lay not in the individual practices themselves but in 
their integration, systematisation, and (re)direction through the Secretary of State’s administrative 
offices, and the re-articulation of the entire apparatus in the interests of state. Indeed, Thurloe’s 
vision of intelligence was remarkably forward looking, visualising both problems for peace and 
stability and opportunities for advantage and gain as always only possibilities which could 
(therefore) be foreseen and manipulated to the best effect. As Foucault (2007) made clear, seeing 
events in this way - as remote and yet undetermined ‘eventualities’ - is a decidedly governmental 
endeavour. Unlike sovereignty, the art of government is future oriented and involves the ‘right 
disposition of things’ to lead to ‘suitable ends’; ends which are always more than its own 
continuation (Foucault, 2007, p. 98; drawing upon La Perriere, 1598).
50
 Since the ends of 
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government are always ‘distant’ in space and time, obstacles to reaching those ends will always 
appear as ‘possibilities’ which can be known, calculated, and governed. Borrowing Foucault’s 
analogy (2007, p. 97), governing a ship therefore means taking care of your sailors, your vessel 
and your cargo, but it also means attending to ‘possible eventualities’ like high winds, dangerous 
reefs, and potential storms; it means ‘taking possible events…into account’.  
 
Put another way, Thurloe’s art of intelligence is only possible if the events, developments and 
processes vital to the preservation and expansion of the state are conceived as potentialities that 
can be foreseen and managed. This approach to intelligence is thus distinctly governmental, 
seeking to produce the knowledge necessary for calculations about the future. And yet given the 
unmistakably future-oriented concerns of mid-century raison d’Etat – to prevent risks to the state 
while seizing opportunities for growth – and ubiquitous routines of secrecy, something more is 
required of intelligence, something different. Indeed the art to Thurloe’s vision for intelligence 
lay not just in reading private letters, stealing secrets, and amassing information, but in 
combining, comparing, and ordering quite different forms of information in ways which revealed 
what was not otherwise visible. His apparatus encompassed more than just a set of information 
collection devices; having a ‘constant view of things’ was only one dimension to intelligence, 
and one which acquired its utility and significance in terms of a much broader set of procedures. 
To make all of this information useful, a set of processes also needed to be developed for 
arranging, compiling, contrasting, and synthesizing the myriad reports, narrations and letters his 
office received from all over Europe. Written testimonies of events in major European cities, 
reports on the deliberations of some distant Court, insider accounts of on-going trade 
negotiations, tales of recent troop movements, and so on, all had to be read and compiled, 
contrasted and compared, and integrated with what was already known. The ciphered and often 
anonymous letters passed along by spies had to be authenticated and decrypted, substantiated and 
corroborated, before they could be merged with other accounts. Duplicated correspondence, 
along with letter openers’ personal annotations, had to be scrutinised, sifted and collated in fine 
detail. And all of this quite different material had to be assembled and organised, evaluated and 
thought about in ways that made it both manageable and useful. 
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Much of this organisational work fell to the Secretary’s many deputies, clerks and assistants (and 
eventually a number of Undersecretaries) who accumulated, arranged and even prioritised much 
of what Thurloe would eventually see. Through such procedures, a fairly continuous stream of 
quite variable information – in different formats and from different sources, regions, and times – 
could be assembled into a coherent if constantly developing body of knowledge which was 
constantly updated and refined, talked about and dissected, in ways that revealed things not 
immediately discernible from a single report or letter. Explicit evidence of some acute danger – 
say imminent ‘troubles from within [or] invasions from abroad’51 – was immediately passed on to 
Thurloe (and, through him, to Cromwell), yet the routinisation of systematic processes for 
reading, sorting, integrating and collating information enabled something more. Rather than 
hoping a timely and damning letter would be seized at the post office or a trusted spy would 
discover the seeds of uprising, the organisational dimensions of intelligence allowed more 
circumstantial or indirect information to be combined and juxtaposed in ways which exposed 
some possibility (whether disagreeable or advantageous), including its dimensions, its likelihood 
and its potential severity. While such processes might appear rather crude when compared to 
current practices, they were quite innovative for the time. Integrating quite different forms of 
material allowed new information to acquire its meaning and significance not only in terms of 
what it directly implied, but also in terms of what it revealed when it was combined with other 
information, and with what was already known. Reports of a surge in letters sent through the 
private carriers in London, increased activity in and around the residence of the French 
ambassador, tales from the counties of growing numbers at night time assemblies, and reports 
from spies in France of more frequent meetings of the ‘Sealed Knot’ - when taken together – 
indicated something particular about the prospect for general uprising, and even allowed the 
estimation of its likelihood, severity, and impact. Warnings from the continent of degrading 
relations between the northern states, reports of troop deployment along the borders, and accounts 
of merchants fleeing major ports, suggested not only impending war but also new opportunities 
for proposing trade talks with soon to be warring neighbours.  
 
Manipulating information in such ways, the art of intelligence embodied what might be referred 
to as an early form of ‘estimation’52 - a non-probabilistic means for identifying good and bad 
possibilities for the state. Techniques of estimation deploy assemblages of instruments which 
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collectively seek to render possible (uncertain) calculations about the future. In a forthcoming 
article, O’Malley & Roberts characterise one such assemblage as ‘cumulative dangerousness’; a 
form of estimation which appears in early insurantial practice, and which uses the epistemology 
of the list and the inspectoral gaze to accumulate more and more information to reach toward 
perfect knowledge. In governmental terms, such techniques supply the preconditions necessary 
for concrete (governmental) intervention by allowing knowledge to be developed, delineated and 
diagnosed in particular ways (see also, Rose & Miller, 1992; Walters, 2002). Like all forms of 
governmental reason, the art of governing through raison d’Etat ‘depends upon calculations in 
one place about how to affect things in another’ (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 238), and is therefore 
wholly contingent upon certain forms of calculation. Different forms of calculation in turn 
require specific knowledge about the future; knowledge which must be produced and assembled 
in ‘locales’ (or ‘centres of calculation’) where it can be worked upon, ordered and made useful 
for government. Thurloe’s art of intelligence therefore comprised a set of ‘inscription devices’ – 
the letters, reports, and narrations his office solicited – which transformed distant events and 
processes into ‘information’ which could be transmitted to London (see, Latour, 1987; see also, 
Rose & Miller, 1992; Walters, 2002). But it also involved a set of procedures for integrating, 
comparing and juxtaposing this material in ways which made possible futures visible, thinkable 
and governable. In this sense, intelligence made government through raison d’Etat both possible 
and effective. Put another way, the dangers and opportunities that the state needed to manage had 
first to be engineered in governable form; that is, they had to be represented and depicted in a 
way that would allow them to be thought about, talked about and acted upon. This process of 
‘making up’ or constituting possible risk/opportunity is inherently governmental: it does not seek 
to ‘reproduce the visible’ but rather ‘renders visible’ for the purposes of government (Miller, 
1990, p. 317).
53
 In a quite literal sense then, Thurloe’s art of intelligence constructed possible 
future events as concrete, thinkable and governable ‘problem-objects’ (Walters, 2002, p. 91).  
 
Discussion: Intelligence as Governmental Technique 
As all of this makes clear, the realities of a European field of competition and exchange between 
states and the requirements of mid-century raison d’Etat – including the need to develop 
knowledge in an environment saturated by routines of secrecy – supplied the conditions 
necessary for the invention of a novel governmental technique which would enable calculations 
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about the future. Producing and manipulating (often secret) information in ways which would 
reveal possible hazards and opportunities for the state, intelligence comprised a set of practices 
not for ‘mastering the state’ (Miller & Rose, 1990) but rather all that which might affect its 
stability and growth. This certainly included any imminent threats from within or from without. 
Yet these were to be visualized and represented as merely one form of (advantageous or 
disagreeable) possibility. In seeking the continued strength, stability and expansion of the 
Commonwealth, Thurloe’s art of intelligence therefore contributed to both the formation and 
growth of the early modern state. His efforts to establish a universal system of correspondence - 
as a mechanism for controlling information flows - and the development of a state administered 
post furnished the Commonwealth with specific institutions, apparatuses and relays which 
endured for some time as key dimensions of the early English state. In providing him with 
strategic advantage in his dealings and negotiations with his European neighbours, and in limiting 
the ability of his rivals to dominate trade, control the seas, and master the colonies, intelligence 
also functioned as a constitutive feature of European balance and equilibrium. This provides a 
useful corrective to the not uncommon perception that intelligence was (and is) inherently about 
discovering and preventing threats. If the art of intelligence is indeed linked to mid-century 
raison d’Etat, as has been shown here, then the notion that its roots can be found in military and 
defense requirements can also be questioned. In fact the need to develop economic and 
commercially relevant knowledge is not only evident in Thurloe’s design, it also significantly 
intensifies after the Restoration in 1660, when English priorities shifted even further toward 
trade, colonial expansion and financial strength.  
 
Perhaps most crucially, this analysis reveals an entirely novel way of thinking about and studying 
intelligence. As a form of governmental technique that appears quite early on in the genealogy of 
state power/knowledge, intelligence ought to assume a more prominent position in Foucauldian 
analyses that have traditionally eschewed its form, trajectory and mutations. One of Foucault’s 
most important contributions of course was the idea that techniques have their own histories 
which can be considered independently of any particular logic or rationality. Thus,   
 Documenting and analysing techniques independently…is important because while 
 certain logics…have certain affinities with particular techniques…the choice of logic does 
 not absolutely determine which techniques will be used. Techniques are often borrowed 
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 creatively in an ad hoc manner, and so they need to be studied separately rather than 
 being relegated to the extra-theoretical realm of ‘implementation’. (Valverde, 2011, p. 9; 
 emphasis in original) 
In other words, there is nothing which inherently ties intelligence to raison d’Etat, and a useful 
way forward would be to continue diagnosing its many historical and contemporary variations. 
There has already been work carried out on ‘national intelligence’ and (increasingly) on 
‘intelligence-led policing’, yet much more needs to be done. In fact our present seems almost 
saturated with different models of intelligence, both within and beyond the state, which seems to 
be playing an increasingly central role in governing fields as diverse as fire, health and disease 
prevention, business, borders and crime. Adding studies of intelligence to the growing body of 
work on contemporary anticipatory logics and techniques would therefore be of great value. A 
well-seasoned and today rather commonplace technique, intelligence deserves a place alongside 
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1
 There is evidence, for example, that by the turn of the 18
th
 century, the French had outpaced the English in both 
secrecy and intelligence; ‘tis plain the French outdo us at these two things, secrecy and intelligence, and that we may 
match them in these points is the design of [my] proposal’ (Defoe, 1704/1955, p. 265). 
2
 With some notable exceptions (for example, Der Derian, 1992; Rathmell, 2002; Neocleous, 2003; Dillon, 2003), 
studies of intelligence have often taken a rather realist approach. The field of ‘intelligence studies’ is comprised of 
mostly policy oriented researchers and a substantial number of practitioners, journalists and ‘insiders’. One of the 
core debates in the leading academic journals is how to properly define ‘intelligence’, which is considered a 
necessary first step in developing a universal theory of intelligence (see for example, Scott & Jackson, 2004). The 
three most common characterizations of intelligence build upon Sherman Kent’s (1949) landmark Strategic 
Intelligence for American World Policy. For Kent, intelligence can be understood as either: (i) a type of ‘strategic 
knowledge’ (or what has more recently been referred to as ‘evaluated information’; see also Gill, 2000, 2006; Aclin, 
2010); (ii) the organizations that produce this knowledge; or, (iii) the activities and methods that these organizations 
employ in doing so (see also, Rathmell, 2002). Historical treatments often begin with one definition or another, and 
proceed by charting the evolutionary course of a particular institution or practice. 
3
 The emphasis on governmentality, liberalism and police is evident from – and perhaps in part driven by - the 
publication of what are perhaps the two most influential English collections dealing with Foucault’s work: The 
Foucault Effect (see Burchell et al., 1991) and Foucault and Political Reason (see Barry et al., 1996).  
4
 As Foucault (2007, p. 287) put it,  
 What the intervention of raison d’Etat must arrive at is the state’s integrity, its completion, consolidation, 
 and its re-establishment if it has been compromised, or if a revolution has overturned it or momentarily 
 suspended its strength and specific effects.  
5
 Early surveys of Ireland by William Petty for example, were carried out in order to help Cromwell dole out land to 
his most loyal soldiers, while John Graunt’s ‘mortality rolls’ were driven by fears over the plague.  
6
 Among which were the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), widespread peasant uprisings and urban revolts in the 
middle of the century, and prolific scarcity and financial crises near its end. 
7
 It was noted in the English House of Commons in 1621 for example that ‘to reason of state and the preservation of 
state is most fit in this place’ (from Neocleous, 2003, p. 43). Similarly, Chemnitz wrote during the Peace of 
Westphalia (1647-48) that ‘Every day we hear an infinite number of people speaking of raison d’etat. Everyone joins 
in, those buried in the dust of the schools as well as those with the responsibilities of public office’ (Thuau, 1966, p. 
9-10, n. 2). 
8
 For Botero, the preservation and expansion of a state depends upon the ‘peace and tranquility of subjects’, which 
must be ensured by averting ‘war waged by a foreign power’, forestalling ‘civil war, in which the subjects fight each 
other’, and preventing ‘rebellion or revolt, in which [subjects] fight their ruler’ (Botero, 1606, p. 12). 
9
 For Bacon - as Foucault makes clear in dissecting his 1625 essay ‘Of Seditions and Troubles’ – the forces which 
can destabilize a state must be constantly attended and avoided. The most destructive of these are sedition, rebellion, 
and revolt – those ‘internal’ causes of ruin which come from within.  
10
 While the threat of invasion by an aggressive neighbour certainly never disappeared, many argued that the most 
insidious causes of ruin were those that came from within. 
 [W]hich are the most pernicious causes [of ruin]? Without doubt, internal causes; for it rarely happens that 
 external causes bring about the downfall of a state which has not already been corrupted by internal ones. 
 (Botero, 1606, p. 5)  
11
 For Botero, ‘[c]learly it is a greater task to preserve a state, because human affairs wax and wane as if by a law of 
nature’ (1606, p. 5). Here,  
 …raison d’Etat is essentially…protective…what is involved is essentially identifying what is necessary and 
 sufficient for the state to exist and maintain itself in its integrity. (Foucault, 2007, p. 258) 
12
 In France ‘les Secretaire d’Etat’, in Spain the Secretarios de Estado y del Despacho. 
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13
  In the seventeenth century…the administrative duties performed through [the secretary’s] office steadily 
 increased. As the privy council declined in importance as an administrative body owing to its large numbers 
 and the increased complexities of government…the secretaries of state…emerged in the forefront of 
 political life as heads of the chief executive offices of the state.  (Higham, 1925, p. 366) 
14
 It has been said that from the appointment of the first Secretary of State, England was governed ‘not through peers 
of ancient lineage’ but by a new ‘gentlemanly class’ of Cromwells, Sadlers, Petres, and Cecils (Dicey, 1760, p. 42; 
see also, Brown, 1968; Kleimola, 1987).  
15
 These powers were drawn from Sir Robert Beale’s ‘Treatise on the office of a Counsellor and Principal Secretarie 
to her Majestie’. Beale was Chief clerk to Queen Elizabeth’s principal secretary Francis Walsingham. 
16
 Throughout the Restoration period, which began in 1660 after Charles II was (re)installed as King of England, 
there were two Secretaries of State; one for dealing with northern Europe (the Northern Department) and one for 
dealing with southern Europe. Both Secretaries shared responsibility for domestic and colonial affairs.   
17
 British Library Manuscript #47133. Egmont Papers (1576-1733), Vol. CCXIV (ff. ii+276). 
18
 Moreland is writing after the Restoration of the English monarchy. 
19
 Moreland is here referring to the beheading of Charles I in 1649. 
20
 This from a letter written by Isaac Basire to Sir Phillip Musgrave, 17 May, 1665. Durham University Library, 
Cosin Letter Books, 1(b): 132. 
21
  Thus did one Mr. Cockin, a preacher to a gathered Congregation, constantly for divers years together 
 discover to Mr. Thurloe (though with all secrecy imaginable) all the proceedings and consultations of his 
 Independent brethren, and had a salary of 500lb. per annum for his pains; and thus did Sir Richard Willis 
 betray all the Councills and undertakings of the Royallists. (from John Wildman’s ‘brief discourse 
 concerning the business of intelligence’, printed in Firth, 1898). 
22
 This is taken from ‘A brief discourse concerning the business of intelligence and how it may be managed to the 
best advantage’, authored sometime during the Restoration, likely by John Wildman (printed in, Firth, 1898). 
23
 From John Wildman’s ‘brief discourse concerning the business of intelligence’ (printed in Firth, 1898). 
24
 From Thomas Scot’s account of his actions as an intelligencer during the Commonwealth (printed in Firth, 1897). 
25
 From the 1663 lease of the office to Daniel O’Neil. 
26
 From John Wildman’s ‘brief discourse concerning the business of intelligence’ (printed in Firth, 1898). See also 
the ‘confession’ of Thomas Scot (printed in Firth, 1897) and Hobman (1961, p. 19).  
27
 From John Wildman’s ‘brief discourse concerning the business of intelligence’ (printed in Firth, 1898). See also 
the ‘confession’ of Thomas Scot (printed in Firth, 1897). 
28
 After learning of the practice, a French official advised his Court in Paris to consider carefully future 
correspondence, as the English had developed,   
 …tricks to open letters more skillfully than anywhere in the world. Some even go the length of fancying 
 that it is the thing to do, and that it is not possible to be a great  statesmen without tampering with packets.  
(from documents printed in Jusserand, 1892, p. 50) 
29
 From a document found in the Secretaries office, now in the British Library (see also Fraser, 1956, p. 59). 
30
 Taken from a letter from Secretary Coventry to Lord Arlington, September 18, 1677. 
31
 From John Wildman’s ‘brief discourse concerning the business of intelligence’ (printed in Firth, 1898). 
32
 From Moreland’s Discourse; British Library Manuscript #47133. Egmont Papers (1576-1733), Vol. CCXIV (ff. 
ii+276). 
33
 To protect their identities, 
The manner how he corresponded with spyes either beyond sea, or from the countries here in England was 
thus: the said Moreland gave them some false addresse whereby to direct all their letters…and at the same 
time sent the same addresse to Mr Dorislaus at the post office to put it down upon his list, that so when he 
opened the maile, and found such an addresse, he might know whether to send them. 
34
 From Thomas Scot’s account of his actions as an intelligencer during the Commonwealth (from Wildman’s 
Discourse, printed in Firth, 1897). 
35
 Largely by virtue of their higher social standing. A collection of the sorts of letters written by intelligencers has 
been compiled by Thomas Birch, who found them to be a more interesting account of history than official state 
papers (see Birch, 1849). 
36
 Translated from the anonymous 1736 Discours historique a Monseigneur le Dauphin sur le Gouvernement 
interieur du Royaume; see Brian (1994, p. 155).  
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
37
 These instruments included a new ‘diplomatic’ form of warfare, a system of diplomacy which sought to preserve 
the ‘greatest possible stability’, the creation of permanent standing armies, and an information apparatus (see 
Foucault, 2007, p. 301-306). 
38
 This fourth dimension of the military-diplomatic apparatus is mentioned only in the original manuscript for 22 
March, and is for some reason not taken up in the lecture (see Foucault, 2007, p. 306 and footnote). 
39
 As John Wildman noted in his discourse on intelligence: 
Another intrigue in the businesse of Intelligence is this: All Ambassadors and publique Ministers, are for the 
most part but great spies, and one of the most acceptable services they can doe their masters, is to gaine for 
mony some of the Ministers, Councellors, Secretaries, or other Officers of that Kingdome or state where 
they reside. And therefore there ought to bee a strickt watch upon them, and their letters constantly opened, 
and it were not difficult to place in their houses by some other hand at a distance some trusty person, who 
might be entertained as their domestique servants, and by that means discover who come into them at back 
dores in the night and the like. 
40
 The struggle between private printers and the English Secretaries of State has been dealt with at length by Levy 
(1985) and Stephens (2007).  
41
 As Thomas Scot confessed after the Restoration: 
I had much to doe and much of my time was spent … in suppressing the swarming number of pamphleteers, 
 which sooner or later I always got into my power (printed in Firth, 1897, p. 121) 
42
 After the English Revolution of 1688, state control over printing was more difficult to justify and to sustain, as 
1689-1690 saw a number of private pamphleteers and publicly available gazettes spring up in and around London. 
The onslaught of print after the Revolution was facilitated by both the Penny Post (originally established in London 
in 1680, and long considered a threat to Secretarial control over printed matter) and the opening of ‘coffee-houses’ in 
which patrons gathered to talk, and in which professional intelligencers plied their trade (Fraser, 1956). With the 
accession of William and Mary in 1688, the monopoly on print that the Secretaries had enjoyed disintegrated as 
private licenses were handed out and the ‘private press’ began to emerge (Williams, 1908). 
43
 Prohibitions date back at least the early 1500’s, and some even proscribed ‘spoken news’. In 1538 King Henry 
VIII decreed that all printed matter had to be approved by the Privy Council, and in 1557, Queen Mary granted a 
Royal Charter to the Company of Stationers which restricted the right of owning a press. As Clarke (2004, p. 13) 
notes,  
To publish news was seen as an interference with the affairs of state which would expose the workings of 
government to the giddy multitude and undermine the relationship between governors and governed. Even 
‘spoken news’ […] was prohibited by Edward VI’s proclamations of 1547 and 1549.    
The only form of printed information available for much of the 16
th
 century was the ‘relation’, a narrative of a single 
event typically authored by the sovereign, boasting of military victory or describing an item of ‘wonderful and 
strange newes’ (Clarke, 2004, p. 13). 
44
 See note 43. 
45
 Especially France, Spain and the Dutch; see Firth (1897b). 
46
 Drawn from the instructions to Sir William Trumbull upon leaving for France; see, Clark (1938, p. 104) 
47
 From Tomas Scot’s confession; printed in Firth (1897, p. 122) 
48
 Both those at home and abroad, like the ‘Sealed Knot’, a group of exiled nobles in France who sought to 
coordinate royalist uprisings in England (Aubrey, 1990, p. 95-96). 
49
 From Wildman’s ‘brief discourse concerning the business of intelligence’ (see, Firth, 1898, p. 532). 
50
 Sovereignty also has an ‘end’, but one which is characterised in terms of the ‘common good’ - a condition in 
which subjects obey the law and respect the established order. Thus ‘the end of sovereignty is circular; it refers back 
to the exercise of sovereignty’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 98). 
51
 From Thomas Scot’s account of his actions as an intelligencer during the Commonwealth (printed in Firth, 1897, 
p. 125). 
52
 I am grateful to Pat O’Malley for pointing this out. 
53
 Statistics, for example, is knowledge of the state, but it is also a means of constituting the state as a visible, 
measurable and manipulable entity (see for example, Hacking, 1990). That is, by measuring and ascribing values and 
categories to specific aspects of the state, ‘the state’ is literally constructed in concrete form. Similarly, accounting is 
more than just a technical mechanism for recording economic transactions; as Peter Miller (1990) has shown, by 
attributing financial values to specific social practices, accounting procedures inscribe certain processes with a 
concrete visibility, calculability, and ‘operational utility’.  
54
 See for example, O’Malley (2004), Lakoff (2006), Lentzos & Rose (2009), O’Malley (2010). 
